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ABSTRACT 
We propose a new approach for secret key exchange involving the variation of the cavity length of an ultra-long 
fibre laser. The scheme is based on the realisation that the free spectral range of the laser cavity can be used as an 
information carrier. We present a proof-of-principle demonstration of this new concept using a 50-km-long fibre 
laser to link two users, both of whom can randomly add an extra 1-km-long fibre segment.  
Keywords: fibre lasers, fibre optics communications, optical security and encryption. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The intrinsic low linear losses of optical fibres at telecommunication wavelengths and the availability of lumped 
or distributed devices for optical amplification enable fibre lasers with cavity length of several hundred kilometre 
scale [1]. The feasibility of extending the laser cavity over the whole communication link connecting the two 
parties, forming an ultra-long fibre laser (UFL), has raised ground-breaking possibilities in communications and 
particularly in secure communications. An innovative concept of a key-distribution system based on an erbium-
doped or Raman gain UFL has been recently proposed and demonstrated [2-5]. In this scheme, each of the two 
users (conventionally called Alice and Bob) places a randomly chosen, spectrally selective mirror at his/her end 
of the fibre laser, with the two-mirror choice representing a key bit. The security in this scheme stems from 
lasing states that have lost distinguishability, from the perspective of a potential eavesdropper, because of their 
symmetry. The key is coordinated from dynamic changes of the laser Bragg reflectors and from lasing state 
characterisation by the legitimate end users. While the classical UFL scheme does not ensure the same security 
as ideal quantum key distribution, its prospective application offers a practical and secure way to distribute secret 
keys, in which security is set from technological bounds. The quest for a simple classical key distribution 
scheme, employing standard, readily available components and facilitating long-link ranges and high bit rates, 
still remains relevant. 
    In this work we describe a new way of exchanging a secret key over an UFL link, which relies on random 
changes of the free spectral range (FSR) of the laser cavity rather than on random changes of the cavity losses 
[6]. Consequently, unlike the previously proposed UFL scheme, our laser is always above the lasing threshold, 
and operates in alternating rapid transient and steady-state modes keeping the same optical bandwidth. The key 
idea of our work is based on the simple observation that the FSR of a laser cavity can be used as an information 
carrier and, hence, processing the FSR traces can make the information bits available all along the cavity. 
Measurement of the few-kilohertz-wide FSR can be performed, e.g., by a real-time analysis of the electrical 
signal supplied by a photodiode that detects one of the laser outputs. Specifically, in this scheme, referred to as 
radio-frequency shifting key exchange (RFSKE), the FSR is switched between different values by simply adding 
or subtracting fibre segments of given lengths to or from the cavity. This can be easily implemented by using 
1×N switches with N different optical fibre paths so to change the cavity length in a predesigned way. In our 
implementation N=2, and two out of four possible combinations of cavity length choices give the same value of 
FSR, which entails the possibility of having an undetectable bit of information. Instead of a random insertion of 
optical band-pass filters (BPFs), here we use the periodic filtering of the cavity to modify the laser spectrum in a 
way that it carries the information bits itself. The principle of switching the laser frequency, for instance, by 
changing the laser cavity length, is a known technique to induce coherent optical transient phenomena in 
metrology for molecular diagnostics [7,8]. A similar scenario naturally occurs in frequency-shifted feedback 
lasers, where the cavity is modified during the course of time by an inline frequency shifter [9,10]. Note also 
incidentally that the idea of secret key exchange using a combination of short and long path lengths reminds a 
quantum optics cryptographic scheme known as the Franson interferometer [11]. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first time that the concept of FSR coding for secret key exchange is considered in the 
context of UFL cryptography. 
     
2. OPERATION PRINCIPLE AND EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP 
 
                                    
Figure 1. Schematic of the experimental set-up. BPF, band-pass filter; EDF, erbium-doped fibre; SMF, single-
mode fibre. 
 
Figure 1 depicts a schematic of the UFL-based RFSKE system. The system consists of a bidirectional, 50-km-
long ring fibre laser, in which in order to exchange a key bit, Alice and Bob independently choose to add a 1-km-
long segment of fibre or let the cavity length unchanged, with the corresponding indicator functions being ‘1’ 
and ‘0’, respectively. Both Alice and Bob have their own random number generators to select one of the two 
possible options each time. Thus, the laser has a length determined by the combination of users’ random choices 
and taking on the values: 50 km (0,0 state), 51 km (0,1 or 1,0 state) and 52 km (1,1 state), and hence, random is 
also the FSR. A potential eavesdropper, Eve, measuring the FSR in the (0,0) or (1,1) state can easily infer the 
corresponding cavity length choices and therefore, the bits in these cases are rejected. However, in the (1,0) and 
(0,1) states leading both to the same FSR, Eve is unable to determine from a measure of FSR which user chose 
which length, thus rendering the key-bit exchange secure. Alice, knowing her own length choice, can determine 
the complementary choice of Bob, and vice versa. The two of them can therefore assign, for example, a logical 
‘H’ to the (1,0) state and a logical ‘L’ to (0,1). Once the distinguishable states (0,0) and (1,1) are removed, the 
remaining sequence of states (0,1) and (1,0) will represent   a random sequence of binary symbols ‘H’ and ‘L’, 
which can then   be used as a key for encrypting and decrypting a message exchanged between Alice and Bob 
over  a standard transmission system.  
    The two single-mode fibre drums in Fig. 1 play the role of an existent public infrastructure. Each of the two 
bays, called Alice and Bob, provides two allowed access points to the bidirectional ring through 90/10 tap 
couplers with the terminals A1, A2, and B1, B2. Each bay has two 12-m-long segments of erbium-doped fibre 
(EDF) that are core pumped by a 980-nm diode. A 5-nm-wide optical BPF centred at the fixed wavelength of 
1559 nm is placed in the middle of each bay. These filters only limit the spectral window in use and do not play 
any direct role in coding. The optical power at the laser output ports is approximately 80 μW when the laser is 
operated slightly above threshold. An electro-optic ceramic switch is placed close to each fixed filter. A 
transistor-transistor logic signal can reconfigure the laser by changing the state of the switch from bar to cross 
mode. In bar (0) mode, the switch simply connects the main input to the main output; in cross mode (1), the 
switch adds an extra propagation over 1 km of fibre in a ‘loop in loop’ configuration. A computer-generated 
random number is sent to a microprocessor unit (Arduino DUE) that controls the state of both switches via two 
logic level shifters. The detection of the laser output is ensured by a 1-GHz indium gallium arsenide photodiode 
connected to the analogue input of the same microprocessor unit that provides a 12-bit analogue to digital 
conversion. The numerical Fourier transform is then computed on the computer to obtain the FSR. 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The left panel of Fig. 2 depicts the optical spectra of the laser for the four possible states as obtained from 
measurements taken close to the lasing threshold and for two distinct laser central wavelengths. A common 
feature of all spectral profiles is a sharp peak with a 3-dB width of 0.11 nm and located at 1560.5 nm or 1560.7 
nm. Importantly, the (0,1) and (1,0) states have closely similar spectra (subplots  c) and d)). This would make it 
difficult for Eve to deduce the states by measuring the optical spectrum. To reduce the unavoidable irregularities 
in the spectra due to the different spectral responses of the switches at the different driving voltages, we included 
an additional tuneable 100-GHz optical BPF into the laser cavity. This filter simply makes the optical spectra 
more similar to each other and does not play any role in information coding. The laser system was on hold 
during the time of the optical spectrum analysis. The filter’s inclusion made it possible to manually change the 
central wavelength of the laser and thus, show that in principle our laser can work at different wavelengths. In 
the application of our FSR-based key exchange protocol we used electronic control to keep the laser central 
wavelength fixed.  
 
 
  
                                                                          
Figure 2. Left: Optical spectra of the ultra-long fibre laser for the four states and for two possible central 
wavelengths: 1560.5 nm (subplots a) and c)) and 1560.7 nm (subplots b) and d)). The vertical line shows the 
1560.5-nm wavelength for ease of reading. The black curves are for state (0,0), the  red curves are for state 
(1,1), the blue curves are for states (0,1) and the green curves for state(1,0). Right:  Example of constellation 
diagram summarising the output readings of 2000 experimentally generated random states of the laser. The red 
dots are for state (1,1), the black dots are for state (0,0), the blue dots are for state (0,1) and the green dots are 
for state (1,0). Adapted from Ref. 6. 
 
    The crucial point of the proposed RFSKE scheme lies in a fast detection of the FSR through the analysis of the 
electrical signal emitted by a photodiode. It is useful to recall here that the time-domain analysis of the intensity 
of a light field I(t) relies on the acquisition of the fourth-order correlation function of the field (see, e.g., Ref. 9). 
We note that a change in FSR originating in a change in cavity length is reflected by a slight frequency shift of a 
component or tone of the radio-frequency spectrum of the laser. Therefore, to shorten the acquisition time and/or 
to facilitate the reading of the laser states, one can inspect those tones that are located at frequencies multiple of 
the basic FSR: the higher the multiple order the larger the tone’s frequency shift. Because the laser radio-
frequency spectrum takes the form of a frequency comb, when the frequency shift of a given tone exceeds the 
tone’s bandwidth, the corresponding change in cavity length can easily be detected. However, the frequency 
detuning being measured should not exceed half of the FSR; this situation is somewhat similar to  that entailed 
by a recently proposed scheme of dual-comb spectroscopy [12]. In our proof-of-principle experiment, we 
analysed the electrical signal from the photodiode with a radio-frequency spectrum analyser, and we found that 
the FSR was approximately 4-kHz wide. By looking at the radio-frequencies close to 20 kHz, which represents a 
multiple of five of the FSR, we observed that a change of 2% in laser length (1 km) brings a frequency shift of 
0.4 kHz, which is a multiple of five of a 2% change in FSR. This confirmed the point made above. The proposed 
RFSKE protocol enables one to write bits of information into physical hertz of the spectrum with an efficiency 
that can be higher than that of laser cryptographic systems based on a random hopping of the laser optical central 
wavelength [3]. In our implementation of the scheme, the numerical Fourier transform is used to detect the 
hopping in central frequency arising from a change in cavity length. Since the state of the laser is stored in an 
equivalent radio-frequency bandwidth, with the RFSKE scheme, the available optical bandwidth can be fully 
utilised to make multiple pairs of users sharing a common fibre link and using different laser channels work in 
parallel. The results in the left panel of Fig. 2 show that the laser central wavelength can be easily modified by 
fine tuning of the 100-GHz filter. This confirms the potential of extending the proposed RFSKE scheme to a 
parallel cascade laser configuration in which each of M lasers operates at a different central wavelength: Alice 
and Bob would then operate M subsystems centred at different wavelengths and connected to the common public 
network fibre by multiplexers/de-multiplexers. The transmission speed would increase by a factor of M in such 
case.     
    The buffer of our analogue-to-digital converter has a size of 20 000 sampled values, corresponding to a 
temporal window of 20 ms. In principle, such a temporal window would allow for random generation and 
reading of 50 laser states per second, although one has to set apart some time for the laser transients (the round 
trip light time in the cavity is 0.24 ms). The principle of our coding/decoding process was tested by randomly 
generating 2000 laser states and reading the electrical output signal from the photodiode. The decision step is 
also of critical importance for a fast evaluation of the FSR. Once the 20 000 samples were received and Fourier 
transformed, the strategy that we adopted to detect the FSR was again based on monitoring the fifth harmonic of 
the signal spectrum, as this proved to be effective in our case. We evaluated the spectral intensities p1, p2 and p3 
of the signal I(t) at the respective frequencies 20.4 kHz, 20 kHz and 19.6 kHz, thereby generating a triplet of 
values (p1, p2, p3) for each data acquisition. The compliance bandwidth of the spectral profiles was 0.2 kHz. Each 
reading and signal processing operation can be represented as a point in the three-dimensional space of the (p1, 
p2, p3) parameters which plays the role of a constellation diagram, as shown in the right panel  of Fig. 2. Once 
the three values are calculated for each reading, if the condition p1>p2>p3 is satisfied, a decision is made in 
favour of the longest possible laser cavity (0,0 state). Similarly, the condition p1<p2<p3 identifies the shortest 
cavity (1,1 state). The two states (0,1) and (1,0) are in principle indistinguishable since they both attain the same 
frequency position. In our measurements, we kept track of the random number generated by the computer so that 
to detect wrong decisions. Two thousand laser states were generated randomly, and their signatures could be 
recognised from the FSR and the known choices of Alice and Bob in the 98.95% of cases. The results obtained 
are summarised in the right panel of Fig. 2. Different laser states are rendered with points of different colours by 
the random number generator: black indicates the (0,0) state, red is for the (1,1) state, blue is for (0,1) and green 
is for (1,0). The distinguishability of the symbols at the receiver is visualised in this constellation diagram by the 
net distinction among the point clouds of the same colour (corresponding to the same switch settings). An error 
would be visualised in the diagram as a point of a different colour from the surrounding cloud. The 
indistinguishability of the secure bit states from the perspective of an external eavesdropper is visualised by an 
overlap of the blue and green clouds: in this volumetric region the probability of Eve confusing the (0,1) state 
with the (1,0) state is very close to the ideal case of 50% (i.e., no knowledge of the key). Such a probability is 
drastically reduced for the legitimate users since they can keep track of their own random choice; this fact is 
represented in the diagram by the coexistence of the two colour clouds in the same volume. We would like to 
note that the time-domain fluctuations of the laser induce changes of several orders of magnitude in the elements 
of the triplets, and such values are plotted on a logarithmic scale. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We have described a new approach to secret key exchange for laser cryptography, and carried out a proof-of-
principle demonstration of this new concept. We have experimentally demonstrated how the radio-frequency 
spectrum of an UFL can be used to establish a secure communication between two parties. Although the 
demonstrated classical cryptographic scheme cannot ensure the same security level than that provided by 
idealised quantum key distribution systems, we believe that it represents an interesting trade-off solution to 
enforce the security of communication systems beyond the standard software protocols and employing 
conventional, off-the-shelf components. Limitations of the current implementation and future perspectives will 
be discussed at the conference. Our results open up new avenues to studies involving non-traditional schemes for 
secure communications. Furthermore, the radio-frequency monitoring of an UFL can be of interest for 
applications in diverse research fields, such as in distributed sensing. 
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